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PRICING FOR LARGE POSITIONS IN CONTINGENT CLAIMS
SCOTT ROBERTSON
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT. Approximations to utility indifference prices are provided for a contingent claim in the large
position size limit. Results are valid for general utility functions on the real line and semi-martingale models.
It is shown that as the position size approaches infinity, the utility function’s decay rate for large negative
wealths is the primary driver of prices. For utilities with exponential decay, one may price like an exponential
investor. For utilities with a power decay, one may price like a power investor after a suitable adjustment to the
rate at which the position size becomes large. In a sizable class of diffusion models, limiting indifference prices
are explicitly computed for an exponential investor. Furthermore, the large claim limit is seen to endogenously
arise as the hedging error for the claim vanishes.
1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen an explosive growth in the financial derivatives market. Indeed, according
to [5], the notional size of the over-the-counter derivatives market increased from $94 trillion in June of
2000, to $707 trillion as of June of 2012. Similarly, U.S. issuance of mortgage backed securities ([41])
increased from $496 billion to $3.2 trillion between 1996 and 2003 before reverting back to $1.7 trillion in
2011. Due to their complexity, these contracts are often neither easily traded nor hedged. The purpose of this
article is to identify a means for pricing such instruments which takes into account market incompleteness,
investor risk aversion, and most importantly, the large position size. In particular, it is sought to identify
which aspects of the market and the investor are the primary drivers of prices.
Let q denote the position size in a derivative contract which the investor holds, but may not trade. The
goal is to study the (average bid) utility indifference price p = pU (x, q) in the limit that q →∞. Here, U is
the investor’s utility function and x is the initial capital. p is defined through the balance equation
(1.1) uU (x− qp, q) = uU (x, 0),
where, given (x, q), the value function uU (x, q) represents the optimal utility an investor may achieve by
trading in the underlying market. The idea behind indifference pricing traces back to [24] and the topic
has been extensively studied : see [9] for a comprehensive review. Clearly, to compute p, knowledge of
the value function uU is crucial. However, except for a few special utility functions and models, uU is not
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explicitly known. This presents the primary challenge to obtaining indifference prices and motivates the
study of their approximation.
One approximation occurs in the small claim limit (i.e. as |q| ↓ 0). Here, [12, 13] obtain first order
approximations in a Brownian setting, while [3, 38, 37, 28, 32, 4] obtain asymptotic results, regarding both
pricing and hedging strategies, for the exponential utility (as well as for general utilities on the real line
in [37, 4]) in varying degrees of generality. In [31], small claim approximations are obtained for utilities
defined on the positive axis. A key feature present in all these articles is that the market is kept constant as
the claim size becomes small. Also, almost by construction, this approximation is not appropriate for large
investors.
A second approximation occurs by taking a sequence of markets which is becoming complete in some
sense. In [13], asymptotics are provided in a basis-risk model as the correlation parameter between the
hedgeable and unhedgeable shocks approaches one (this case is treated in detail in Section 5). [29] obtains
results in a Brownian setting in the case of both fixed and vanishing portfolio constraints. A key feature of
these papers is that as the market changes, the claim size remains fixed.
In contrast to the above asymptotics, for large positions is desirable to allow both the position size and
market to vary. This follows by considering the relationship between owning and hedging a claim. Indeed,
as shown in Section 5, in a Brownian setting with exponential utility, given the opportunity to purchase
claims for an arbitrage free price, the optimal position size to take (see [25, 42]) satisfies the heuristic
relationship
(1.2) risk aversion × position size× hedging error ≈ constant.
Thus, for a fixed risk aversion, large position sizes arise in conjunction with vanishing hedging errors, and
hence the market should be allowed to vary. In fact, through the lens of (1.2), large claim analysis can
be thought of as treating the regime where position size × hedging error ≈ constant, as opposed to the
small claim or asymptotically complete limits where position size × hedging error ≈ 0. Given the notional
amounts outstanding, the former regime is entirely consistent with markets where hedging errors are nearly
negligible.
Using the above as motivation, for a given sequence of markets Mn, claims hn, and respective position
sizes qn, the “large claim limit” is defined through two requirements. First (clearly), that qn →∞. Second,
that asymptotically the Mn do not permit arbitrage. Note that this certainly includes the regime when
additionally, (1.2) holds but does not require it. For a fixed market, it is shown in [37] that no arbitrage is
equivalent to unU (x, 0) < U(∞), where unU (x, 0) is the value function in the nth market when no claims
are held. As n ↑ ∞, the analogous statement is lim supn↑∞ unU (x, 0) < U(∞). This is enforced in
Assumptions 3.2 and 4.2 : see Remark 3.3 and Proposition 6.1. The idea is that for limiting prices to have
any meaning, the sequence of markets asymptotically should not allow for risk-less profit.
To avoid cumbersome admissibility restrictions, the claims hn are assumed to be uniformly bounded and
utility functions U on the whole real line are considered. The main results of the paper, Theorem 3.4 and
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Proposition 4.3 state that the decay of U for large negative wealths is the primary investor-specific determi-
nant of the limiting indifference price. For exponential decay, Theorem 3.4 shows prices come together for
all utilities U with the same rate of decay. This theorem has the simple, practical message that an investor
with utility function U should ascertain if there is some α > 0 such that limx↓−∞−(1/x) log(−U(x)) = α
(see Examples 2.5 and 2.6 for two important, non exponential utilities), and if so, price like an exponential
investor with risk aversion α. Furthermore, under the additional restriction that log(U(x)/(−e−αx)) re-
mains bounded as x ↓ −∞ (see Definition 3.7) Theorem 3.9 shows that the total monetary error incurred by
approximating via exponential prices remains bounded, providing a rate of how fast prices come together.
For utilities with power-like decay the situation is more complicated. Here, U is assumed to satisfy
limx↓−∞−U(x)/(−x)
p = 1/l for some p > 1, l > 0. Proposition 4.3 shows that prices do come together
for all suchU , but only after the position size qn has been suitably altered to (−unU (x, 0))1/pqn. Even though
this implies that prices will typically not come together for the non-adjusted sizes qn, Proposition 4.3 still
allows for prices to be computed using the more manageable utility function Up(x) = −(1/p)(−x)p, x ≈
−∞ (more precisely, for the convex conjugate function Vp(y) = ((p − 1)/p)yp/(p−1): see equations (3.1)
and (4.1)).
In addition to the over-the-counter derivatives market, large claim limit pricing has applications to the
insurance industry. [6] considers large positions pricing for liabilities with both financial and insurancial
risks, such as revenue insurance contracts or mortality derivatives. Here, the claim is actually the sum of the
contracts. The crucial assumption in [6] is that the large claim limit naturally arises, not in conjuction with
vanishing hedging error, but rather with vanishing absolute risk aversion, as can be deduced by (1.2).
This paper is organized as follows : Section 2 introduces the general setup for both the models and the
family of utility functions, in the exponential decay case. Section 3 gives the main results for the exponential
decay case, as well as providing examples to highlight the minimality of the given assumptions. Section 4
gives the corresponding results for the power decay case. Using [43], which identifies the value function
for an exponential investor, Section 5 computes limiting prices and monetary errors in a class of stochastic
volatility, or basis risk, models. Proposition 5.3 shows there are essentially three limiting indifference
prices, depending upon the rate at which qn becomes large. As will be discussed, this trichotomy of limiting
prices appears to be general feature of large claim analysis, and is intimately related to the theory of Large
Deviations. Section 5 also motivates the relationship in (1.2), discussing its validity from an equilibrium
standpoint using the notion of partial equilibrium price quantities introduced in [1]. Section 5 concludes by
showing that asymptotic market completeness is best defined through the primal lens of vanishing hedging
errors, rather than the dual lens of collapsing families of martingale measures. Sections 6, 7 and Appendix
A contain the proofs.
2. SETUP
2.1. Assets and Martingale Measures. Let T > 0 denote the horizon. For each n, let (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn)
be a filtered probability space where the filtration Fn = (Fnt )0≤t≤T satisfies the usual conditions of right-
continuity and Pn completeness. Assume FnT = Fn and zero interest rates so that the safe asset S0 is
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identically one. The risky asset Sn = (Sn1 , . . . , Sndn) is a locally bounded, R
dn
-valued semi-martingale.
In addition to being able to trade in Sn, the investor owns qn units of a non-tradable, Fn measurable,
contingent claim hn.
For n ∈ N, denote by Mn the set of probability measures Qn ≪ Pn on Fn such that Sn is a local
martingale under Qn. Recall that for any µ ≪ Pn on Fn the relative entropy of µ with respect to Pn is
given by H (µ | Pn) := EPn [(dµ/dPn) log (dµ/dPn))]. Since it plays a central role in the analysis below,
define:
Definition 2.1. M˜n := {Qn ∈Mn : H (Qn | Pn) <∞}.
Two important examples are:
Example 2.2 (Stochastic Volatility with High Correlation). Consider the stochastic volatility model where
the asset S and volatility Y satisfy the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dSnt
Snt
= µ(Yt)dt+ σ(Yt)(ρndWt +
√
1− ρ2ndBt); dYt = b(Yt)dt+ a(Yt)dWt;(2.1)
where W,B are independent Brownian motions and ρn ∈ (−1, 1). When hn = h(YT ) for a function h on
the state space of Y , these are alternatively called “basis-risk” models. For exponential utility, utility-based
pricing has been extensively studied : see [23, 12, 43, 35, 21, 22, 9, 34] amongst others. Large claim pricing
results for this class of models is given in Section 5. When hn = h(YT , SnT ) see [26, 9] for utility-based
pricing results which are based on Partial Differential Equation methods.
Example 2.3 (Large Markets). Consider, as in [14], when the claim is written on a large market consisting
of infinitely many assets, but the investor is restricted to trading in the only the first n assets. As an example,
let the assets evolve according to
(2.2) dS
i
t
Sit
= αidt+ dW it ; i = 1, 2, . . . ,
where W 1,W 2, . . . are a sequence of independent Brownian motions and
∑∞
i=1(α
i)2 <∞. h is a bounded
claim measurable with respect to the sigma field σ(W 1,W 2, ...). For concreteness, h can be either an index
option (see [10]) or a suitably weighted sum of independent claims hn where hn is a function of Sn (see
[33]). Pricing results for this latter case are briefly discussed in Section 5.2.
2.2. Utility Functions. Throughout the article, a utility function will denote any strictly increasing, strictly
concave function U ∈ C2(R). The following class is of particular importance:
Definition 2.4. For α > 0, denote by Uα the set of utility functions satisfying limx↑∞ U(x) = 0 and
(2.3) lim
x↓−∞
−
1
x
log (−U(x)) = α.
The canonical example of U ∈ Uα is the exponential utility Uα:
(2.4) Uα(x) := − 1
α
e−αx.
However, Uα is a richer class of utility functions, as the following examples show.
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Example 2.5 (Fund Manager). Consider the case of several investors with respective utilities Uj ∈ Uαj , αj >
0 for j = 1, . . . , J . As is typically done in target date retirement funds, assume these investors pool their
wealths into a common fund and delegate a manager to invest the sum. The manager’s utility function
then takes the form U(x) :=
∑J
j=1wjUj(x), where {wj}
J
j=1 are the respective weights of each individual
investor. It readily follows that U ∈ Uα for α := maxj=1,...,J αj .
Example 2.6 (Representative Market Maker). This example concerns the representative market maker from
equilibrium theory, which dates back to [36] and has been extensively studied : see [30, 11, 17, 2] amongst
others. Recall that for a utility function U , the absolute risk aversion is defined by
(2.5) αU (x) := −U
′′(x)
U ′(x)
.
For j = 1, ..., J , let Uj be utility functions with limx↑∞Uj(x) = 0, and with risk aversions which satisfy
i) there is a Kj > 1 such that 1/Kj ≤ αUj (x) ≤ Kj for all x ∈ R; and ii) limx↓−∞ αUj(x) = αj > 0.
l’Hôpital’s rule implies Uj ∈ Uαj . For v ∈ (0,∞)J the representative market maker’s utility is:
(2.6) Uv(x) := sup
y1+...+yJ=x
J∑
j=1
vjUj(yj).
Here, [2, Theorem 4.2] implies for all v that Uv ∈ Uα where α :=
(∑J
j=1(1/αj)
)−1
.
For a general U ∈ Uα, it can be shown that U satisfies the Inada conditions limx↓−∞ U ′(x) = ∞ and
limx↑∞ U
′(x) = 0 as well as the conditions of Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity (see [40]):
(2.7) lim inf
x↓−∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
> 1; lim sup
x↑∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1.
The normalization U(∞) = 0 is performed only to ensure log(−U(x)) is defined for all x ∈ R. If a utility
function U is bounded from above and satisfies (2.3) then U(x) − U(∞) ∈ Uα. Lastly, for any utility
function U denote by V the convex conjugate to U :
(2.8) V (y) := sup
x∈R
{U(x)− xy} .
It is straightforward to check that for U ∈ Uα, V ∈ C2(0,∞) is strictly convex, can be continuously
extended to 0 by setting V (0) = U(∞) = 0 and satisfies limy↓0 V ′(y) = −∞, limy↑∞ V ′(y) = ∞.
Furthermore
lim
y↑∞
V (y)
Vα(y)
= 1; Vα(y) := sup
x∈R
{Uα(x)− xy} =
1
α
y(log(y)− 1).(2.9)
2.3. The Value Function and Utility Indifference Price. Let n ∈ N. A trading strategy Hn is admissible
if it is predictable, Sn integrable under Pn, and such that the gains process (Hn · Sn) remains above a
constant a (which may depend upon Hn) almost surely on [0, T ]. Denote by Hn the set of admissible
trading strategies. Now, let α > 0 and U ∈ Uα. For x, q ∈ R, the value function unU (x, q;hn) is defined by
(2.10) unU (x, q;hn) := sup
Hn∈Hn
EP
n
[U (x+ (Hn · Sn)T + qh
n)] .
6 LARGE POSITION PRICING
Note that n appears in two places. The superscript n outside the parentheses accounts for the dependence
of Sn and Hn upon n. The n in hn represents the fact that the claim may be changing with n. In the case
where hn ≡ 0, set
(2.11) unU (x) := unU (x, q; 0).
Define the average utility indifference (bid) price pnU (x, q;hn) implicitly as the solution to the equation
(2.12) unU (x) = unU (x− qpnU (x, q;hn), q;hn).
Thus, pnU(x, q;hn) is the amount an investor would pay per unit of hn so as to be indifferent between owning
and not owning q units of the claim.
Remark 2.7. For the exponential utility Uα it is well known that the indifference price does not depend upon
the initial capital (see [32]). Thus, write pnUα(q;hn) for pnUα(x, q;hn).
3. INDIFFERENCE PRICES IN THE LARGE CLAIM LIMIT
pnU (x, qn;h
n) is now studied in the limit that qn → ∞. Proofs of all assertions made herein are given
in Section 6. The main result states that for any x1, x2 ∈ R and U1, U2 ∈ Uα, as qn → ∞ the difference
between pnU1(x1, qn;h
n) and pnU2(x2, qn;h
n) vanishes. The intuition for this result is gained by inspecting
the indifference pricing formula obtained in [37, Proposition 7.2 (vi)], which is valid in the current setup:
(3.1) pnU (x, qn;hn) = inf
Qn∈M˜n
V
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
qn
αnU (Q
n)
)
,
where the entropic penalty functional αnU is given by
(3.2) αnU (Qn) := inf
y>0
1
y
(
EP
n
[
V
(
y
dQn
dPn
)]
+ xy − unU (x)
)
.
Here, V is from (2.8), and M˜nV is the subset of Mn such that EP
n
[V (dQn/dPn)] <∞.
For U ∈ Uα, Lemma A.2 below implies that M˜nV = M˜n and hence the variational problem above is
taken over the same set of measures. Furthermore, as qn → ∞, the factor of (1/qn) in front of αnU (Qn)
means small values of V (z) may be disregarded. Therefore, by (2.9) one may replace V (z) with Vα(z) in
(3.2). Calculation then shows that αnU (Qn) ≈ x+ (1/α) (log(−αunU (x)) +H (Qn | Pn)), and hence
pnU (x, qn;h
n) ≈
1
qnα
log(−αunU (x)) + inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
α
H (Qn | Pn)
)
.
Thus, if lim supn↑∞ unU (x) < U(∞) = 0, the only part of pnU (x, qn;hn) dependent upon either x or U
vanishes, and prices come together.
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3.1. Convergence of Prices. The above argument is made precise under the following assumptions. First,
it assumed that hn is uniformly bounded in n:
Assumption 3.1. ‖h‖ := supn ‖hn‖L∞(Ωn,Fn,Pn) <∞.
The next assumption essentially rules out arbitrage opportunities when investing in Sn, both for each n
(see [37, Assumption 1.4]) and as n ↑ ∞. Recall, from Section 2.1 the definitions of M˜n and the relative
entropy H (Qn | Pn).
Assumption 3.2. M˜n 6= ∅ for each n and lim supn↑∞ infQn∈M˜n H (Q
n | Pn) <∞.
Regarding Assumption 3.2, it is well known (see [25, 37, 15]) that for the exponential utility Uα,
(3.3) unUα(x, qn;hn) = −
1
α
exp
(
−αx− inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
αqnE
Qn [hn] +H (Qn | Pn)
))
.
Now, consider when qn ≡ 0 and Assumption 3.2 does not hold : i.e. for each k = 1, 2, . . . there is an
integer nk such that infQnk∈M˜nk H (Q
nk | Pnk) > k. Since the infimum is strictly bigger than k, (3.3)
implies the existence of an admissible trading strategy H(nk) such that
Pnk
[
(H (nk) · S
nk)T ≥
k
2α
]
≥ 1− e−k/2.
Therefore, a very strong form of asymptotic arbitrage holds : namely, there exists a sequence of admissible
trading strategies such that the probability that the terminal wealth fails to grow like k decreases to 0 expo-
nentially fast on the order of k. An asymptotic arbitrage of the form above is similar to a strong arbitrage
as defined in [20]: see this reference for a more detailed discussion on the topic.
Remark 3.3. As shown in Proposition 6.1 below, Assumption 3.2 implies for all U ∈ Uα and x ∈ R that
lim supn↑∞ u
n
U (x) < 0 = U(∞). This corresponds to the preclusion of asymptotic arbitrage as mentioned
in the introduction.
The main result is now presented:
Theorem 3.4. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Let α > 0. If qn → ∞ then for all U1, U2 ∈ Uα and
x1, x2 ∈ R
(3.4) lim
n↑∞
∣∣pnU1(x1, qn;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn;hn)∣∣ = 0.
Remark 3.5. Since for any U ∈ Uα and x ∈ R, pnU(x, qn;hn) = −pnU(x,−qn;−hn) the convergence in
Theorem 3.4 remains valid for qn → −∞ as well.
3.2. Convergence of Total Quantities. Results are now stated which, for x1, x2 ∈ R and U1, U2 ∈ Uα,
ensure the total monetary difference
qn
∣∣pnU1(x1, qn;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn;hn)∣∣ ,
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remains bounded as n ↑ ∞. The message is that an investor with utility function U ∈ Uα and initial capital
x ∈ R may price as if she were an exponential investor with risk aversion α and the error in the total amount
of money spent by using this approximation remains bounded, even in the large claim limit.
This type of convergence will not take place under the general conditions of Theorem 3.4 (see Example
3.12) and requires stronger assumptions upon the utility functions. However, under these stronger assump-
tions it is not necessary for the claim to remain uniformly bounded as in Assumption 3.1. Therefore,
assume:
Assumption 3.6. For each n, hn ∈ L∞ (Ωn,Fn,Pn).
As for the class of utility functions, convergence results are proved for U˜α ⊂ Uα defined by:
Definition 3.7.
(3.5) U˜α :=
{
U ∈ Uα : 0 < lim inf
x↓−∞
U(x)
Uα(x)
≤ lim sup
x↓−∞
U(x)
Uα(x)
<∞
}
.
Remark 3.8. In Example 2.5, if for j = 1, ..., J , Uj(x) = −(1/αj)e−αjx then U ∈ U˜α. Similarly, in
Example 2.6, if the Uj therein additionally satisfy Uj ∈ U˜αj for j = 1, .., J then U ∈ U˜α.
With these definitions and assumptions, total monetary errors are bounded:
Theorem 3.9. Let α > 0. Let Assumptions 3.2 and 3.6 hold. If qn → ∞ then for all U1, U2 ∈ U˜α and
x1, x2 ∈ R
(3.6) lim sup
n↑∞
qn
∣∣pnU1(x1, qn;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn;hn)∣∣ <∞.
Remark 3.10. For the exponential utility price pnUα(qn;h
n) of Remark 2.7, consider when Theorem 3.9 holds
and pnUα(qn;h
n) converges to some limit pα. Even though for x ∈ R, U ∈ U˜α both limn↑∞ pnU (x, qn;hn) =
pα and lim supn↑∞ qn|pnU (x, qn;hn)−pnUα(qn;h
n)| <∞ hold, it still might be that limn↑∞ qn|pnU (x, qn;hn)−
pα| =∞ (see Proposition 5.7 for examples). Here, even though the error in the total amount spent by using
exponential utility prices (instead of the original utility U ) remains bounded, the error introduced by using
the limiting price for exponential utility tends towards infinity.
3.3. Pricing when Only the Position is Changing. Assume only the position size changes with n, i.e.:
(Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn) ≡ (Ω,F ,F,P), Sn ≡ S and hn ≡ h. Write pU(x, q;h) for pnU(x, q;h) and M˜ for M˜n.
Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, [37, Proposition 7.5] proves, for all U ∈ Uα and x ∈ R:
(3.7) lim
n↑∞
pU (x, qn;h) = inf
Q∈M˜
EQ [h] .
For exponential utilities, (3.7) has been shown in [3, 32]. In fact, for general utilities, (2.3) is not necessary
for this result to hold: [37] proves (3.7) follows for all utility functions satisfying the Inada and Reasonable
Asymptotic Elasticity conditions given in Section 2.2. Additionally, by using duality theory for Orlicz
spaces induced by the utility function, [4, Proposition 4.2] proves an analogous statement to (3.7) for non
locally bounded semimartingales under very weak conditions upon the utility function.
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3.4. Examples. Examples are given to highlight the necessity of a) (2.3) in Definition 2.4 and b) (3.5) in
Definition 3.7. Each of the examples considers the one period trinomial model. Here the filtered space is
Ω = {1, 2, 3}, F = PΩ, F0 = {∅,Ω}, F1 = F . S and h take the respective values:
S0 ≡ 1; S1(1) = 1 + u; S1(2) = 1; S1(3) = 1− u,
h(1) = h(3) = h; h(2) = 0.
(3.8)
where 0 < u < 1, and h 6= 0. Lastly, for each n, let 0 < pn < 1/2 and define Pn by Pn(1) = Pn(3) = pn,
Pn(2) = 1 − 2pn. It is clear that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold, and, for any utility function U satisfying
the Inada conditions, the indifference price pnU (x, qn;h) satisfies
(3.9) U(x) = 2pnU(x− qnpnU (x, qn;h) + qnh) + (1− 2pn)U(x− qnpnU (x, qn;h)).
3.4.1. On the Necessity of (2.3). The first example shows that condition (2.3) is minimal, at least within the
class of utility functions U such that log(αu)) is bounded, to guarantee convergence of prices in all markets
satisfying Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 where exponential prices converge.
Example 3.11. Let Uˆ be a utility function satisfying i) limx↑∞ Uˆ(x) = 0 and ii) for some KU > 1,
(1/KU ) ≤ αUˆ (x) ≤ KU for all x ∈ R. Assume that (2.3) fails : i.e. for some 0 < α < α:
(3.10) α = lim inf
x↓∞
−
1
x
log
(
−Uˆ(x)
)
< lim sup
x↓−∞
−
1
x
log
(
−Uˆ(x)
)
= α.
With Uˆ−1 : (−∞, 0) 7→ R as the inverse of Uˆ , there exists qn ↑ ∞ such that −(1/qn)Uˆ−1(−eqn) does not
converge. In the one-period trinomial model with pn = (1/2)(1 − e−qn) and h > (1/α):
1) For all x ∈ R, pn
Uˆ
(x, qn;h) does not converge as n ↑ ∞.
2) For all α > 0, all U ∈ Uα and all x ∈ R, limn↑∞ pnU(x, qn;h) = min
{
α−1, h
}
.
3.4.2. On the necessity of U˜α. If U ∈ Uα, U 6∈ U˜α the convergence result in (3.6) may fail for mod-
els satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2. The example below considers a utility function where U(x) =
(−1/x)Uα(x) for large negative x : such a U can easily be constructed and shown to belong to Uα.
Example 3.12. Let U ∈ Uα be such that for some M > 0, U(x) = (−1/x)Uα(x) if x ≤ −M . Then, in the
one period trinomial model with pn = (1/2)(1 − e−n), h = 1 and qn = n2, for all x ∈ R:
lim
n↑∞
qn
(
pnU(x, qn;h
n)− pnUα(qn;h
n)
)
=∞.
3.5. Risk Aversion Asymptotics. For exponential utility, the absolute risk aversion and the number of
units of the claim held are interchangeable with respect to indifference pricing. Indeed, for any q, α > 0,
Uα(qx) = qUqα(x) for x ∈ R and hence, under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 (note that Hn ∈ Hn ⇐⇒ qHn ∈
Hn):
pnUα(q;h
n) =
1
αq
log
(
unUα(0)
unUα(0, q;h
n)
)
=
1
αq
log
(
qunUqα(0)
qunUqα(0, 1;h
n)
)
= pnUqα(1;h
n).
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Indifference pricing in the large risk aversion limit has been studied in [38, 15] for exponential utilities,
and in [7, 8] where results are extended to general utilities on the real line. Each of these articles show,
under suitable hypothesis, that as absolute risk aversion increases to infinity, if the market and claim are not
changing as well, then the (ask) indifference price for one claim converges the super-replication price of the
claim. This is entirely consistent with the results in Section 3.3 since therein it is the buyer’s indifference
price which is considered.
4. POWER TAILS
Results similar to Theorem 3.4 hold for utility functions with power-like decay for large negative wealths.
However, to obtain convergence of prices, the rate at which qn becomes large must be suitably adjusted. This
phenomenon is not present for utility functions with exponential decay. Proposition 4.3 below makes the
above statement precise. To motivate the result, as well as fix notation, define the following class of utility
functions:
Definition 4.1. Let p > 1 and l > 0. Define Up,l to be the class of utility functions satisfying limx↑∞U(x) =
0 and limx↓−∞−U(x)/(−x)p = 1/l.
It can be shown that U ∈ Up,l satisfies both the Inada and Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity conditions.
Furthermore, for U ∈ Up,l:
(4.1) lim
y↑∞
V (y)
Vp(y)
= 1; Vp(y) := lˆy
γ ,
where γ := p/(p − 1) is the conjugate exponential to p and lˆ := (1/γ)(l/p)γ−1 . Now, consider the
indifference pricing formula from (3.1). The factor (1/qn) again allows one to disregard small values of
V (z) when evaluating αnU (Qn) and hence one may replace V (z) with Vp(z). A lengthy calculation shows
for U ∈ Up,l that αnU (Qn) ≈ (−lunU (x))1/p EP
n
[(dQn/dPn)γ ]1/γ . Substituting the above back in the
indifference pricing formula gives
pnU(x, qn;h
n) ≈ inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
(−lunU (x))
1/p
qn
EP
n
[(
dQn
dPn
)γ]1/γ)
.
Here, Mˆn is the subset of Mn such that EPn [Vp(dQn/dPn)] <∞ and the substitution is allowed because
for all U ∈ Up,l, M˜nV = Mˆn (see Lemma A.2). Therefore, by considering prices not for qn, but rather
qn(−u
n
U (x))
1/p one obtains
pnU (x, qn(−u
n
U (x))
1/p;hn) ≈ inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
l1/p
qn
EP
n
[(
dQn
dPn
)γ]1/γ)
,
and, since the right hand side of the above equation does not depend upon U or x, prices come together. To
formally state the above result, assume, in an analogous manner to Assumption 3.2:
Assumption 4.2. With Mˆn :=
{
Qn ∈ Mn | EP
n
[(dQn/dPn)γ ] <∞
}
, assume Mˆn 6= ∅ for each n and
lim supn↑∞ infQn∈Mˆn E
Pn [(dQn/dPn)γ ] <∞.
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The main proposition now reads:
Proposition 4.3. Let p > 1 and l > 0. Let Assumptions 3.1 and 4.2 hold. If qn → ∞ then for all
U1, U2 ∈ Up,l and x1, x2 ∈ R
(4.2) lim
n↑∞
∣∣∣pnU1(x1, qn(−unU1(x1))1/p;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn(−unU2(x2))1/p;hn)∣∣∣ = 0.
5. PRICING FOR STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY MODELS
The results of Section 3 are now specified to the class of models from Example 2.2. Proofs of all asser-
tions made herein are given in Section 7.
5.1. Model and Assumptions. Let Sn and Y be as in (2.1). Assume that Sn0 = 1 and hn = h(YT ) where h
is a function on the state space of Y . The probability space (Ω,F ,P) is two-dimensional Wiener space and
the filtration is the augmented version of the right-continuous enlargement of the natural filtration FW,B.
Regarding h and the coefficients µ, σ, b and a in (2.1):
Assumption 5.1. For −∞ ≤ l < u ≤ ∞, set E := (l, u). a, b : E 7→ R are continuous and a2(y) > 0
for y ∈ E. Furthermore, the SDE for Y in (2.1) admits a strong solution with respect to the P-augmented
filtration of W with P [Yt ∈ E, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ] = 1. µ, σ : E 7→ R are measurable such that σ2(y) > 0, y ∈ E
and
(5.1) λ(y) := µ(y)
σ(y)
,
is bounded on E. h : E 7→ R is a continuous and bounded function. Lastly, ρn ∈ (−1, 1) for all n.
Assumption 5.1 implies Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 4.2 for any qn →∞. The later two assumptions follow
since Qˆn ∈ Mn for
(5.2) dQˆ
n
dP
:= E
(
−
∫ ·
0
ρnλ(Yt)dWt −
∫ ·
0
√
1− ρ2nλ(Yt)dBt
)
T
,
and for γ > 1, supn EP
n
[
(dQˆn/dP)γ
]
≤ exp
(
γT supy∈E λ
2(y)
)
. Since it used often below, for ρ ∈ R set
(5.3) Z(ρ) := E
(
−ρ
∫ ·
0
λ(Yt)dWt
)
T
; Z := Z(1).
Example 5.2. The “basis risk” case of [23, 12] treats when Sn and Y are two geometric Brownian motions
with instantaneous correlation ρn. This corresponds to E = (0,∞), µ(y) = µ, σ(y) = σ, b(y) = by and
a(y) = ay for µ, b ∈ R and σ, a > 0.
12 LARGE POSITION PRICING
5.2. Large Claim Pricing. Pricing results for U ∈ Uα are now given in the joint limit that qn → ∞ and
ρn → 1. As indicated by Proposition 5.5 below, it is convenient to express qn in terms of (1 − ρ2n)−1 and
hence limiting prices are computed for the following three regimes:
(5.4) qn = γn
α(1− ρ2n)
where


(i) γn → 0 but γn/(1− ρ2n)→∞
(ii) γn → γ > 0
(iii) γn →∞
.
Define Q ∼ P via dQ/dP := Z and note that Q is the unique martingale measure in the complete model
where ρ = 1 and F is augmented natural filtration of W .
Proposition 5.3. Let α > 0, U ∈ Uα and x ∈ R. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Then,
lim
n↑∞
pnU (x, qn;h) = pα :=


(i) : EQ [h(YT )]
(ii) : − (1/γ) log EQ [e−γh(YT )]
(iii) : ess infP [h(YT )] = infy∈E h(y)
.(5.5)
Remark 5.4. The equality in (iii) follows since h is continuous and P [YT ∈ (l′, u′)] > 0 for any (l′, u′) ∈
E. Furthermore, as can be seen in the proof of Proposition 5.3, the result for case (iii) holds when ρn is
constant and γn → ∞. Therefore, (3.7) implies for each n that infQn∈Mn EQn [h(YT )] = infy∈E h(y).
This could also be proved directly using the Martingale Representation Theorem.
The trichotomy of limiting prices above is motivated by the following heuristic argument connecting
limiting indifference prices to the theory of Large Deviations [16]. Assume that (Ω,F ,F,P) and the claim
h do not change with n. For each n, assume h decomposes into h = hn + Zn where hn is perfectly
replicable by trading in Sn and Zn is “completely unhedgeable” in that when pricing Zn, it suffices to
assume that one cannot trade in Sn. This implies unUα(−qnpn, qn;h) = −(1/α)e
αqnpnE
[
e−αqnZn
]
and
hence pnUα(qn;h) = −1/(αqn) log
(
E
[
e−αqnZn
])
.
Assume that h is asymptotically hedgeable in such a manner that {Zn}n∈N satisfies a Large Deviations
Principle (LDP) [16] with rate rn and rate function I where I(z) = 0 ⇔ z = 0. For the sake of sim-
plicity, assume further that the Zn are uniformly bounded, taking values in a set E and that I is finite
on E. Varadhan’s Integral Lemma, [16, Chapter 4] in conjunction with limε↓0 infz∈E(z + I(z)/ε) = 0,
limM↑∞ infz∈E(z + I(z)/M) = infz∈E z yield
lim
n↑∞
pnUα(qn;h) =


0 qn/rn → 0
infz∈E (z + (1/α)I(z)) qn/rn → 1
infz∈E z qn/rn →∞
.
Thus, if qn/rn → 0 there is no large claim pricing effect since Zn → 0 in Probability andL1. If qn/rn →∞
prices converge to the minimum possible value of the unhedgeable component. Lastly, if qn/rn → 1 prices
are adjusted via the rate function I .
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While the above argument is only motivational, the trichotomy of limiting prices does hold for other
models. Indeed, in Example 2.3, take T = 1 and let h =
∑∞
i=1
∫ 1
0 θ
i
t(dW
i
t + α
idt) where
{
θi
}
i∈N
are
deterministic functions satisfying
∑∞
i=1
∫ 1
0 (θ
i
t)
2dt < ∞. (Since h is not bounded, Assumption 3.1 is
violated, however, h does satisfy the more general assumptions of [37] and hence the indifference price is
well defined). A direct calculation shows
(5.6) pnUα(qn;h) = −
1
2
αqn
∞∑
i=n+1
∫ 1
0
(θit)
2dt+ α
∞∑
i=n+1
αi
∫ 1
0
θitdt.
Thus, with rn := (
∑∞
i=n+1
∫ 1
0 (θ
i
t)
2dt)−1 the above conclusions still hold, where the three limiting prices
are i) 0 if qn/rn → 0, ii) −(1/2)αl if qn/rn → l and iii) −∞ if qn/rn →∞.
5.3. Optimal Quantities and Endogenous Large Positions. The heuristic “risk aversion × position size
× hedging error ≈ constant” of (1.2) is now verified in the absence of price impact. Then, using the notion
of partial-equilibrium price-quantities (PEPQ) from [1], large positions are shown to endogenously arise
even in a setting where the buyer must find a single, risk averse seller (as opposed to the more typical
situation where there is a collection of market makers) in order to purchase the claims.
Remark 5.4 (the upper bound follows in a similar manner) implies for each n that the interval of arbitrage
free prices for h(YT ) is
(5.7) I(h) :=
(
inf
Qn∈Mn
EQ
n
[h(YT )] , sup
Qn∈Mn
EQ
n
[h(YT )]
)
=
(
inf
y∈E
h(y), sup
y∈E
h(y)
)
.
Let pn ∈ I(h) and assume one can buy an arbitrary number of claims for the price pn. As considered in
[18, 19], this corresponds to when buyers can easily find either one another or multiple market makers. A
natural problem is to determine the utility based optimal quantity:
(5.8) qn ∈ argmaxq∈R unU (x− qpn, q;h).
For exponential utility, existence of a unique maximizer qn is proved for the general framework of Section
3 in [25, Theorem 3.1]. Specified to the current model, the results in [43] enable the precise identification
of qn, as well as when it becomes large. For ease of presentation set Λ := (1/2)
∫ T
0 λ(Yt)
2dt, and, for any
ρ, γ ∈ R define
(5.9) g(ρ, γ) :=
E
[
h(YT )Z(ρ)e
−(1−ρ2)Λ−γh(YT )
]
E
[
Z(ρ)e−(1−ρ
2)Λ−γh(YT )
] .
Proposition 5.5. Let Assumption 5.1 hold and let pn ∈ I(h). The unique qn solving (5.8) satisfies αqn(1−
ρ2n) = γn where γn is uniquely determined by pn = g(ρn, γn). Let ρn → 1. Then, for any subsequence
{nk}k∈N
(5.10) lim
k↑∞
|qnk | =∞⇐⇒ lim
k↑∞
|pnk − pˆ|
1− ρ2nk
=∞; pˆ := E [Z(1)h(YT )] = E
Q [h(YT )] .
Furthermore, if pn → p for some p ∈ I(h) then limn↑∞ αqn(1 − ρ2n) = γ where γ uniquely solves
p = g(1, γ). γ 6= 0 if and only if p 6= pˆ.
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Remark 5.6. Proposition 5.5 implies that when purchasing optimal quantities, case (iii) in (5.4) never arises.
Case (i) arises if pn → pˆ, where pˆ is the unique arbitrage free price in the complete model. For all other
limiting prices p, case (ii) arises.
Proposition 5.5 implies the heuristic in (1.2), provided for each n one may buy claims at a price p 6=
pˆ. At first glance, it may seem unrealistic that one could engage a seller at this price: however this is
indeed possible in the setting of PEPQ from [1]. To define a PEPQ, some additional notation is needed.
Let X,X ′ be two bounded, FT measurable random variables. For the exponential utility Uα, denote by
unα(qn;h,X) := u
n
Uα
(0, qn;h +X/qn) the value function for holding qn claims of h(YT ) and one unit of
X. Now, consider a second exponential investor with risk aversion δ > 0. A pair (qn, pn) where pn ∈ I(h)
is called a PEPQ in the nth market if
qn ∈ argmaxq∈R (eαqnpnunα(qn;h,X)) ; qn ∈ argmaxq∈R
(
e−δqnpnunδ (−qn;h,X
′)
)
.
In other words, (qn, pn) is a PEPQ if, for the price pn, it is optimal for the δ risk averse investor to sell qn
units of h(YT ) and for the α risk averse investor to buy qn units of h(YT ). As shown in [1, Theorem 5.8,
Remark 5.0, Corollary 3.16], if αX − δX ′ is not replicable then there exists a unique PEPQ with qn 6= 0,
otherwise there is no PEPQ. This is the reason why the additional endowments X,X ′ must be added.
Now, let X ≡ 0 and assume the seller holds a position in h consistent with (1.2): i.e. X ′ = (δγ/(1 −
ρ2n))h(YT ) for some γ > 0. Since h(YT ) is not replicable, it follows that a PEPQ (pn, qn) exists. Further-
more, (pn, qn) must satisfy the optimality conditions (recall (5.9) for qn = γn/(1− ρ2n)):
pn = g(ρn, αγn) = g(ρn, δ(γ − γn)).
It clearly holds that γn = γδ/(δ + α) and pn satisfies pn = g(ρn, γαδ/(α + δ)). Such a pn exists by
Lemma 7.1 below, and, as ρn → 1 it follows that pn → p 6= pˆ where p = g(1, γαδ/(α + δ)). Thus, with
both buyer and seller acting optimally, the buyer enters into the regime of (1.2) and the seller is willing to
sell for a price pn ≈ p 6= pˆ. The message is that as long as there exists a single investor in the regime of
(1.2), whether or not she has entered it optimally, it possible for other investors, acting optimally, to enter
into the regime (1.2) as well. Given the actual notional sizes existing in the market, it is entirely reasonable
to assume some investor is in the regime of (1.2).
5.4. Monetary Errors. It is of interest to know when the monetary error, introduced by using the limiting
exponential utility price, remains bounded. The following Proposition identifies precise conditions on the γn
from (5.4) when this is the case. Then, assuming for each n that one can buy claims for a fixed p ∈ I(h) it is
shown that if one buys the optimal number of claims as in Proposition 5.5 so that γn satisfies p = g(ρn, γn),
then monetary errors are always bounded. For the sake of brevity, case (iii) is excluded.
Proposition 5.7. Let α > 0. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. For qn from (5.4) and pα from Proposition 5.3, as
ρn → 1:
lim sup
n↑∞
qn
∣∣pnUα(qn;h)− pα∣∣ <∞⇐⇒

(i) : lim supn↑∞
γ2n
1−ρ2n
<∞
(ii) : lim supn↑∞ |γn−γ|1−ρ2n <∞
.(5.11)
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Furthermore, if γn is chosen optimally as in Proposition 5.5 for a fixed p ∈ I(h) : i.e. γn satisfies p =
g(ρn, γn) then monetary errors are always bounded.
5.5. On the Optimal Hedging Strategy. Assume qn takes the form in (5.4). As shown in the proof
of Proposition 5.8 below, for an exponential investor, the optimal hedging strategy pˆin ∗ satisfies pˆint =
(1/(ασ(Yt)))
(
λ(Yt) + (ρn/(1 − ρ
2
n))θ
n
t
)
where θn satisfies (recall Λ = (1/2) ∫ T0 λ(Yt)2dt):
(5.12) E
(∫ ·
0
θnt (dWt + ρnλ(Yt)dt)
)
T
=
e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ−γnh(YT )
E
[
Z(ρn)e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ−γnh(YT )
] .
That such a θn exists follows from the Martingale Representation Theorem. Now, if γn → γ 6= 0 then under
the given hypothesis on the model coefficients, θn → θ in the sense that limn↑∞ E
[∫ T
0 (θ
n
t − θt)
2dt
]
= 0,
where θ solves (5.12) at ρn = 1. Thus, even though pˆin is taking ever larger (in magnitude) positions in the
risky asset Sn, the normalized trading strategy pˆin/qn converges to pˆi := θ/(γσ). Then, using (5.12) again
it follows that for pα as in Proposition 5.3, (pα, pi) is a super-hedge in the complete model in that at ρ = 1
−pα + h(YT ) +
∫ T
0
pˆit
dSt
St
=
1
2γ
∫ T
0
θ2t dt.
Furthermore, by the very definition of the indifference price, for the non-normalized strategy pˆin:
E
[
e−α(
∫ T
0
pˆint dS
n
t /S
n
t +qn(h(YT )−p
n
Uα
(qn;h))
]
= −αunUα(0) = E
[
Z(ρn)e
−(1−ρ2n)Λ
]1/(1−ρ2n)
≤ 1,
where the second equality above comes from (7.1) below. Thus, pˆin and the initial capital −qnpnUα(qn;h)
provide a robust “super hedging” strategy in that for any constant C > 0
sup
n
P
[∫ T
0
pˆint dS
n
t /S
n
t + qn(h(YT )− p
n
Uα(qn;h)) ≤ −C
]
≤ e−αC .
5.6. Asymptotic Completeness and the Local Martingale Measures. Though ρn → 1, the family of
local martingale measures M˜n, even when restricted to FW , is not collapsing to a singleton with respect
to the weak convergence of probability measures. This follows immediately from (5.7) since h(YT ) is FW
measurable. Indeed, setting QnW := Qn
∣∣
FW
, (5.7) implies for all n that
sup
Qn∈M˜n
EQ
n
W [h(YT )] = sup
y∈E
h(y); inf
Qn∈M˜n
EQ
n
W [h(YT )] = inf
y∈E
h(y).
Therefore, it cannot be that for any two sequences of measures Qn,1,Q2,n ∈ Mn that limn↑∞ |EQ
n,1
W [h(YT )]−
EQ
n,2
W [h(YT )] | = 0. The next proposition, which finishes the section, reinforces this fact, as well as pro-
vides an alternate description of the difference between the limiting indifference and traded prices in terms
of the relative entropy of two sequences of local martingale measures in M˜n.
∗If the class of admissible trading strategies is enlarged to include strategies such that the resultant wealth process is a Qn
supermartingale for all Qn ∈ M˜n
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Proposition 5.8. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. Let ρn → 1, p ∈ I(h), p 6= pˆ. Let qn, γ be as in Proposition 5.5
and pα be as in case (ii) of Proposition 5.3. Then
(5.13) lim
n↑∞
H
(
Q
n,qn
W | Qˆ
n
W
)
= γ(pα − p),
where Qn,qn ∈ M˜n solves the dual problem (3.3) with qn and Qˆn ∈ M˜n is from (5.2).
6. PROOFS FROM SECTIONS 3 AND 4
6.1. Preliminaries. Unless otherwise stated, all expectations within this section are taken with respect to
Pn and denoted by En. For any Qn ≪ Pn write ZQ,n := (dQn/dPn)|Fn .
Let α > 0, U ∈ Uα and define V as in (2.8). As in Section 3, define M˜nV as the set of Qn ∈ Mn
such that En [V (dQn/dPn)] < ∞. By applying Lemma A.2 with Y = ZQ,n and y = 1 it follows that
M˜nV = M˜
n for all U ∈ Uα. Therefore, the indifference pricing formula (3.1) specifies to
pnU (x, q;h
n) = inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
En
[
hnZQ,n
]
+
1
q
αnU (Q
n)
)
.(6.1)
In a similar manner, Lemma A.2 implies M˜nV = Mˆn for all U ∈ Up,l and hence
pnU (x, q;h
n) = inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
En
[
hnZQ,n
]
+
1
q
αnU (Q
n)
)
.(6.2)
6.2. Proofs. The proofs of Theorems 3.4 and Proposition 4.3 follow two steps:
1) Verify that Assumptions 3.2 and 4.2 imply the "no asymptotic arbitrage" condition lim supn↑∞ unU (x) <
U(∞) = 0 for all U ∈ Uα and U ∈ Up,l respectively.
2) For Vα, Vp as in (2.9) and (4.1) respectively, rigorously justify the substitutions of V with Vα (for
U ∈ Uα) and V with Vp (for U ∈ Up,l) when computing the penalty functionals αnU (Qn).
Proposition 6.1. Let α > 0, p > 1, l > 0 and x ∈ R. Then Assumption 3.2 implies lim supn↑∞ un(x) < 0
for U ∈ Uα. Similarly, Assumption 4.2 implies lim supn↑∞ unU (x) < 0 for U ∈ Up,l.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. In view of Assumptions 3.2 and 4.2 there exist sequences of measures Qn1 ,Qn2 ∈
Mn and a constant C > 0 so that
(6.3) sup
n
En [Vα(dQ
n
1/dP
n)] ≤ C (Ass. 3.2); sup
n
En [Vp(dQ
n
2/dP
n)] ≤ C (Ass. 4.2).
Write Zn1 := dQn1/dPn and Zn2 := dQn2/dPn. For x ∈ R it follows from [37] that
(6.4) unU (x) ≤ inf
y>0
(En [V (yZn1 )] + xy) (U ∈ Uα); u
n
U (x) ≤ inf
y>0
(En [V (yZn2 )] + xy) (U ∈ Up,l).
The argument below is nearly identical for U ∈ Uα and U ∈ Up,l: thus, it will be given for U ∈ Uα
and only the adjustments needed for U ∈ Up,l will be mentioned. Applying Lemma A.3 with Y = Zn1
shows there is a unique yn > 0 solving the minimization problem in (6.4) and the first order conditions are
x = −En
[
Zn,0V ′(ynZ
n
1 )
]
. Assume, for now, that
(6.5) lim inf
n↑∞
yn > 0.
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Using the first order conditions for yn:
unU (x) ≤ E
n [V (ynZ
n
1 )] + xyn = −E
n
[(
ynZ
n
1 V
′(ynZ
n
1 )− V (ynZ
n
1 )
)]
.
Set f(z) := zV ′(z) − V (z). Note that f ′(z) = zV ′′(z) > 0 and limz↓0 f(z) = 0, since U(∞) = 0. In
view of (6.5), take δ > 0 such that yn ≥ δ for large n. Since f is increasing and non-negative
unU (x) ≤ −E
n [f(ynZ
n
1 )] ≤ −E
n [f(δZn1 )] ≤ 0.
Assume, by way of contradiction, there exists a sequence (still labeled n) such that limn↑∞ unU (x) = 0. The
above inequality implies limn↑∞ En [f(δZn1 )] = 0, and hence for all ε > 0 that limn↑∞ Pn [Zn1 ≥ ε] = 0.
In view of (6.3) the Zn1 are “uniformly integrable” in that limλ↑∞ supn En
[
Zn1 1Zn1 ≥λ
]
= 0. This follows
because for all z > 0 and λ > 1
z1z≥λ ≤
λ
Vα(λ)
(
Vα(z) +
1
α
)
;
(
resp. x1x≥λ ≤
λ
Vp(λ)
Vp(z)
)
,
and because limλ↑∞ Vα(λ)/λ = 0 (resp. limλ↑∞ Vp(λ)/λ = 0). Now, fix ε > 0 and choose λ so large that
supn E
n
[
Zn1 1Zn1 ≥λ
]
≤ ε. Since Zn1 ∈ M˜n,
1 = En [Zn1 ] = E
n
[
Zn1
(
1Zn
1
≤ε + 1ε<Zn
1
<λ + 1Zn
1
≥λ
)]
≤ ε+ λPn [Zn1 > ε] + ε.
Taking n ↑ ∞ and then ε ↓ 0 gives a contradiction and hence the result holds assuming (6.5).
To prove (6.5), recall that yn satisfies −x = En [Zn1 V ′(ynZn1 )]. By way of contradiction, assume there
is some sequence (still labeled n) such that limn↑∞ yn = 0. Let (Mn)n∈N be such that limn↑∞Mn = ∞
and limn↑∞ ynMn = 0. For n so large that yn < 1, the strict convexity of V gives
(6.6) − x ≤ V ′(ynMn)En
[
Zn1 1Zn1 ≤Mn
]
+ En
[
Zn1 V
′(Zn1 )1Zn1 >Mn
]
.
The uniformly integrability of Zn1 combined with En [Zn1 ] = 1, limz↓0 V ′(z) = −∞ implies that
limn↑∞ V
′(ynMn)E
n
[
Zn1 1Zn1 ≤Mn
]
= −∞. From [40, Corollary 4.2(ii)] (note: part (ii) therein does
not require U(0) > 0) there exists some K˜ > 0 so that z|V ′(z)| ≤ K˜V (z) for z > 0. Furthermore, since
Mn →∞, for any ε > 0, (2.9) (resp. (4.1)) and the definitions of Vα (resp. Vp) imply that for large enough
n:
V (z)1z≥Mn ≤ (1 + ε)
(
Vα(z) +
1
α
)
; (resp. V (z)1z≥Mn ≤ (1 + ε)Vp(z)).
In view of (6.3), for some large enough K:
lim sup
n↑∞
En
[
Zn1 V
′(ynZ
n
1 )1Zn1 >Mn
]
≤ K;
(
resp. lim sup
n↑∞
En
[
Zn2 V
′(ynZ
n
2 )1Zn2 >Mn
]
≤ K
)
.
Therefore, (6.6) is contradicted if yn → 0, proving the result. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let α > 0, U ∈ Uα and x ∈ R. In view of Proposition 6.1, one may choose ε > 0
so that ε < −unU(x) for n large. Recall the definition of αnU (Qn) in (3.2) and the price pnU (x, q;hn) in (6.1).
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Lemma A.4 with u = −un(x), ε = ε and Y = ZQ,n implies there is a constant C(ε, U) such that
pnU(x, qn;h
n) ≤
x+ C(ε, U) − unU (x)
qn
+ inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1 + ε
qnα
H (Qn | Pn)
)
.
Similarly, from Lemma A.5 with u = −unU (x), ε = ε and Y = ZQ,n there exists constants C(ε, U) and
D(ε, U) such that
pnU (x, qn;h
n) ≥
x− C(ε, U) +D(ε, U) log(−unU (x))
qn
+ inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1− ε
qnα
H (Qn | Pn)
)
.
Consider the function:
(6.7) f(δ, n) := inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] + δH (Qn | Pn)
)
, δ > 0.
Clearly, f is increasing with δ. Furthermore, Assumption 3.2 implies for some constant K > 0 that
f(δ, n) ≤ ‖h‖+Kδ. Let 0 < δ < γ. For any Qn ∈ M˜n
EQ
n
[hn] + γH (Qn | Pn) ≤
γ
δ
(
EQ
n
[hn] + δH (Qn | Pn)
)
+
(γ
δ
− 1
)
‖h‖.
Thus,
(6.8) f(γ, n)− f(δ, n) ≤
(γ
δ
− 1
)
(f(δ, n) + ‖h‖) ≤
(γ
δ
− 1
)
(2‖h‖ +Kδ) .
Now, let U1, U2 ∈ Uα and x1, x2 ∈ R. Choose ε > 0 so that for all n large enough ε ≤ −unU1(x1) ≤
−U1(x1) and ε ≤ −unU2(x2) ≤ −U2(x2). By the above calculations, there is a constant C(n, ε) satisfying
C(n, ε)/qn → 0 for any qn →∞ such that
pnU1(x1, qn;h
n)− pnU2(x2, qn;h
n) ≤
C(n, ε)
qn
+ f
(
1 + ε
qnα
, n
)
− f
(
1− ε
qnα
, n
)
,
≤
C(n, ε)
qn
+
(
1 + ε
1− ε
− 1
)(
2‖h‖ +K
1− ε
qnα
)
.
Therefore
(6.9) lim sup
n↑∞
(
pnU1(x1, qn;h
n)− pnU2(x2, qn;h
n)
)
≤ 2‖h‖
(
1 + ε
1− ε
− 1
)
.
Since the left hand side does not depend upon ε taking ε ↓ 0 gives (3.4) after noting that the roles of U1, U2
and x1, x2 may be switched.

Proof of Theorem 3.9. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 3.4. Let α > 0 and U ∈ U˜α, x ∈ R.
Proposition 6.1 implies one can find ε > 0 so that −unU(x) ≥ ε for large n. Using the representation for
pnU(x, q;h
n) in (6.1) it follows from Lemma A.4 applied to u = −unU (x), Y = ZQ,n that there is a constant
C(ε, U) such that
pnU (x, qn;h
n) ≤
x+ C(ε, U) − unU (x)
qn
+ inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
qnα
H (Qn | Pn)
)
.
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Similarly, Lemma A.5 applied to u = −unU (x), Y = ZQ,n yields the existence of constants C(ε, U),
D(ε, U) so that
pnU (x, qn;h
n) ≥
x− C(ε, U) +D(ε, U) log(−unU (x))
qn
+ inf
Qn∈M˜n
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
qnα
H (Qn | Pn)
)
.
Note that the variational problems in each of the above inequalities are the same. Now, let U1, U2 ∈ U˜α and
x1, x2 ∈ R. Choose ε > 0 so that ε ≤ −unU1(x1) ≤ −U1(x1) and ε ≤ −u
n
U2
(x2) ≤ −U2(x2) for large n.
By the above, there is a constant C(n, ε) such that supn |C(n, ε)| <∞ and
qn
(
pnU1(x1, qn;h
n)− pnU2(x2, qn;h
n)
)
≤ C(n, ε).
Thus, the result follows by first taking limn↑∞ and then switching the roles of U1, U2, x1, x2.

Proof of Example 3.11. By Theorem 3.4, to show that pnU (x, qn;h) converges for all α > 0, U ∈ Uα and
x ∈ R it suffices to consider the exponential utility Uα. As in Remark 2.7, set pnα := pnUα(qn;h
n). (3.9)
gives pnα = −(1/(qnα)) log
(
(1− e−qn)e−αqnh + e−qn
)
, and hence limn↑∞ pnα = min
{
h, α−1
}
.
It is now shown that pn
Uˆ
(x, qn;h) cannot converge for any x ∈ R. To this end, set pn := pnUˆ (x, qn;h).
From (3.9), pn satisfies
(6.10) Uˆ(x) = (1− e−qn)Uˆ(x+ qn(h− pn)) + e−qnUˆ(x− qnpn).
Assume that p = limn↑∞ pn exists. Since it is clear 0 ≤ p ≤ h, first assume that 0 ≤ p < h. Since
Uˆ(∞) = 0, it follows that Uˆ(x) = limn↑∞ e−qnUˆ(x − qnpn). This implies Uˆ(x − qnpn) = αnUˆ(x)eqn
where αn → 1. Thus, recalling pn → p
(6.11) p = lim
n↑∞
−
1
qn
Uˆ−1
(
αnUˆ(x)e
qn
)
= lim
n↑∞
−
1
qn
Uˆ−1
(
−elog(−αnUˆ(x))+qn
)
.
Note that (log(−αnUˆ(x)))n∈N forms a bounded sequence since αn → 1. Set g(z) := U−1(−ez). A
straightforward calculation shows that g′(z) = U(g(z))/U ′(g(z)). Since g(z)→ −∞ as z →∞ it follows
by l’Hôpital’s rule and the fact that 1/KU ≤ αU (x) ≤ KU that
−KU ≤ lim inf
z↑∞
g′(z) ≤ lim sup
z↑∞
g′(z) ≤ −
1
KU
.
Thus, for large enough n
1
qn
∣∣∣U−1(−elog(−αnUˆ(x))+qn)− U−1(−eqn)∣∣∣ ≤ 2KU | log(−αnUˆ(x))|
qn
.
Therefore, in view of (6.11) it follows that p = limn↑∞−(1/qn)Uˆ−1 (−eqn), but this violates the assump-
tion on qn and hence pn cannot converge to p < h. Next, assume p = h and let ε > 0 be small enough so
that h− ε > 0. For large enough n, pn ≥ h− ε. The negativity of Uˆ(x) and (6.10) imply
−Uˆ(x) ≥ e−qn(−Uˆ(x− qnp
n)) ≥ e−qn
(
−Uˆ(x− qn(h− ε))
)
.
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This gives
0 ≥ −1 + lim sup
n↑∞
1
qn
log
(
−Uˆ(x− qn(h− ε))
)
≥ −1 + α(h− ε),
where the last inequality follows by (3.10). Taking ε ↓ 0 gives that α ≤ 1/h but, this violates how h was
constructed. Therefore, p 6= h and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Example 3.12. Set pnα := pnUα(x, n2;hn). Specifying (3.9) for the given parameter values gives
(6.12) n2pnα = −
1
n2α
log
(
(1− e−n)e−αn
2
+ e−n
)
=
n
α
+R(n),
where limn↑∞R(n) = 0. For the given function U and x ∈ R, set pn := pnU(x, n2;h). Using (3.9) again:
(6.13) U(x) = (1− e−n)U(x+ n2(1− pn)) + e−nU(x− n2pn).
Assume that lim infn↑∞ n2(pn−pnα) <∞ and choose a subsequence {nk}k∈N and K > 0 so that n2k(pnk−
pnkα ) ≤ K for all k. By the monotonicity of U it follows from (6.13) that
(6.14) U(x) ≥ (1− e−nk)U(x+ n2k − n2kpnkα −K) + e−nkU(x− n2kpnkα −K).
From (6.12) and U(∞) = 0 it follows that
lim
k↑∞
(1− e−nk)U(x+ n2k − n
2
kp
nk
α −K) = 0.
By construction of U and (6.12) again
lim
k↑∞
e−nkU(x− n2kp
nk
α −K) = lim
k↑∞
−
1
α
e−nk
e−α(x−K)+nk+αR(n)
nk/α− (x−K) +R(n)
= 0.
Therefore, (6.14) implies U(x) ≥ 0, a contradiction. Thus, limn↑∞ n2(pn − pnα) =∞.

Proof of Proposition 4.3. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.4. Namely, let p > 1, l > 0,
U ∈ Up,l and x ∈ R. Proposition 6.1 implies for ε > 0 small enough, ε < −unU(x) for large n. Lemma A.4
with u = −unU (x), ε = ε and Y = ZQ,n yields a constant C(ε, U) so that for all position sizes q (and not
just the qn of the Proposition)
pnU(x, q;h
n) ≤
x+ C(ε, U)
q
+ inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
q
(l(−unU (x) + ε))
1/p (1 + ε)1/γ En
[
(ZQ,n)γ
]1/γ)
.
Similarly, from Lemma A.5 with u = −unU (x), ε = ε and Y = ZQ,n there exists a constant C(ε, U) such
that
pnU(x, q;h
n) ≥
x− C(ε, U)
q
+ inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
EQ
n
[hn] +
1
q
(l(−unU (x)− ε/2))
1/p ((1− ε))1/γ En
[
(ZQ,n)γ
]1/γ)
.
Now, consider the function:
(6.15) fˆ(δ, n) := inf
Qn∈Mˆn
(
EQ
n
[hn] + δEn
[(
ZQ,n
)γ]1/γ)
, δ > 0.
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fˆ is increasing with δ and that Assumption 4.2 implies the existence of a constant K > 0 so that fˆ(δ, n) ≤
‖h‖+Kδ. Let 0 < δ < γ. For any Qn ∈ Mˆn
EQ
n
[hn] + γH (Qn | Pn) ≤
γ
δ
(
EQ
n
[hn] + δEn
[(
ZQ,n
)γ]1/γ)
+
(γ
δ
− 1
)
‖h‖.
Thus,
(6.16) fˆ(γ, n)− fˆ(δ, n) ≤
(γ
δ
− 1
)(
fˆ(δ, n) + ‖h‖
)
≤
(γ
δ
− 1
)
(Kδ + 2‖h‖) .
Note that for any x ∈ R, U ∈ Up,l, since unU (x) ≥ U(x) and lim supn↑∞ unU (x) < 0 there exists some
M > 0 so that 1/M ≤ −unU (x) ≤ M for all n large enough. Now, let U1, U2 ∈ Uα and x1, x2 ∈ R and
consider qn ↑ ∞. Choose M > 0, ε > 0 so that for all n large enough ε < 1/M ≤ −unUi(xi) ≤ M ; i =
1, 2. By the above calculations
pnU1(x1, qn(−u
n
U1(x1))
1/p;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn(−u
n
U2(x2))
1/p;hn)
≤
C+(ε, n) − C−(ε, n)
qn
+ fˆ
(
δ+(ε, n)
qn
, n
)
− fˆ
(
δ−(ε, n)
qn
, n
)
,
(6.17)
where
C+(ε, n) :=
x1 + C(ε, U1)
(−unU1(x1))
1/p
; C−(ε, n) :=
x2 + C(ε, U2)
(−unU2(x2))
1/p
,
δ+(ε, n) :=
(
1−
ε
unU1(x1)
)1/p
l1/p(1 + ε)1/γ ; δ−(ε, n) :=
(
1 +
ε/2
unU1(x1)
)1/p
l1/p(1− ε)1/γ .
Since C±(ε, n)/qn → 0 as n ↑ ∞ for all ε > 0 they may be disregarded. Also, note that δ+(ε, n) >
δ−(ε, n) and
δ+(ε, n)
δ−(ε, n)
≤
(1 + εM)1/p(1 + ε)1/γ
(1− εM/2)1/p(1− ε)1/γ
; lim
n↑∞
δ−(ε, n)
qn
= 0.
It thus follows from (6.18) and (6.16) that for all ε > 0
lim sup
n↑∞
(
pnU1(x1, qn(−lu
n
U1(x1))
1/p;hn)− pnU2(x2, qn(−lu
n
U2(x2))
1/p;hn)
)
≤ 2‖h‖
(
(1 + εM)1/p(1 + ε)1/γ
(1− εM/2)1/p(1− ε)1/γ
− 1
)
.
(6.18)
Taking ε ↓ 0 gives the result after noting that the roles of U1, U2 and x1, x2 may be switched.

7. PROOFS FROM SECTION 5
7.1. Preliminaries. A key fact used in all the proofs below is that under Assumption 5.1, the value function
for the exponential utility Uα takes the form [43, Proposition 3.3]:
(7.1) unUα(0, qn;h) = −
1
α
EP
[
Z(ρn) exp
(
−(1− ρ2n)
(
αqnh(YT ) +
1
2
∫ T
0
λ(Yt)
2dt
))] 1
1−ρ2n
,
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where Z(ρn) is given in (5.3). Recall that Λ = (1/2)
∫ T
0 λ(Yt)
2dt and note that Z(ρn)e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ =
Zρne−(1−ρn)Λ where Z = Z(1). In accordance with (5.4) set γn = α(1 − ρ2n)qn. Using (7.1) and the
definition of pnUα(q;h
n) in (2.12)
(7.2) pnUα (qn;h) = −
1
qnα
log
(
unUα(0, qn;h)
unUα(0)
)
= −
1
γn
log
(
E
[
Zρne−(1−ρn)Λ−γnh(YT )
]
E
[
Zρne−(1−ρn)Λ
]
)
,
Therefore, the proofs of Propositions 5.3 and 5.7 rely heavily on the analysis of the function
(7.3) f(ρ, γ) := E
[
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γh(YT )
]
E
[
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ
] ; ρ, γ ∈ R.
The bounded-ness of Λ, h(YT ) combined with the fact that Z has exponential moments of all orders,
imply that f is smooth in (ρ, γ) and that derivatives may be computed by pulling the differentiation
operator through the expected value operator. Furthermore, for the function g from (5.9), g(ρ, γ) =
−∂γ log(f(ρ, γ)).
7.2. Proofs. The following Lemma is used throughout and is a basic result on Esscher transformations. Re-
call from Remark 5.4 that ess infP [h(YT )] = infy∈E h(y) and (similarly) ess supP [h(YT )] = supy∈E h(y).
Lemma 7.1. Let Assumption 5.1 hold. For ρ, γ ∈ R let g(ρ, γ) be as in (5.9). Then
i) For ρ fixed, g is strictly decreasing in γ with limγ↓−∞ g(ρ, γ) = supy∈E h(y) and limγ↑∞ g(ρ, γ) =
infy∈E h(y).
ii) For p ∈ (infy∈E h(y), supy∈E h(y)) and ρ ∈ R, there exists a unique γ = γ(ρ) such that p =
g(ρ, γ(ρ)). The map ρ 7→ γ(ρ) is C1 on R.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Calculation shows
∂γg(ρ, γ) = −Var
P˜ [h(YT )] ;
dP˜
dP
:=
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γh(YT )
E
[
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γh(YT )
] .
so that g is strictly decreasing. Set h := ess infP [h(YT )] = infy∈E h(y). Clearly, g(ρ, γ) ≥ h. Now, let
m > 0 be such that P [h(YT )− h < m] > 0 and P [h(YT )− h ≥ m] > 0. For γ > 0 and K > 0 large
enough
g(ρ, γ) = h+
E
[
(h(YT )− h)Z
ρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γ(h(YT )−(h+m))
]
E
[
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γ(h(YT )−(h+m))
] ,
≤ h+m+
K
E
[
Zρe−(1−ρ)Λ−γ(h(YT )−(h+m))1h(YT )<h+m
] .
Fatou’s Lemma now yields lim supγ↑∞ g(ρ, γ) ≤ h + m. Taking m ↓ 0 gives the result. The result for
limγ↓−∞ g(ρ, γ) follows by a similar argument.
As for ii), part i) clearly gives, for each ρ ∈ R and each p ∈ I(h), a unique γ(ρ) such that p = g(ρ, γ(ρ)).
The result now follows by the Implicit Function Theorem [39, Theorem 9.28], since g is smooth in ρ, γ and,
as was shown in part i), ∂γg(ρ, γ) 6= 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 5.3. Recall pnUα from (7.2) and f from (7.3). Case (i) is handled first. Here, Taylor’s
formula and f(ρn, 0) = 1 yield
f(ρn, γn) = 1 + γn∂γf(ρn, 0) + (1/2)γ
2
n∂
2
γγf(ρn, ξn); 0 ≤ ξn ≤ γn.
Since for all (ρ, γ), |∂γf(ρ, γ)| ≤ supy∈E |h(y)| and |∂2γγf(ρ, γ)| ≤ supy∈E |h(y)|2, the approximation
log(1 + x) ≈ x for small x implies that limn↑∞ pnUα(qn;h) = −∂γf(1, 0) = E [Zh(YT )]. The results
for case (ii) follow immediately from the continuity of f and f(1, γ) = EQ [exp (−γh(YT ))]. As for case
(iii), set h = ess infP [h(YT )]. Clearly lim infn↑∞ pnUα(qn;h) ≥ h. Now, let m > h, Am = {h(YT ) < m}
and note that P [Am] > 0. Then
E
[
Zρne(1−ρn)Λ−γnh(YT )
]
≥ e−γnmE
[
Zρne−(1−ρn)Λ1Am
]
,
so that, using (7.3) and (7.2), lim supn↑∞ pnUα(qm;h) ≤ m. The result follows taking m ↓ h. 
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Recall g from (5.9). [25, Theorem 3.1] gives that the optimal qn satisfies the first
order conditions
pn = −
1
α
∂qu
n
Uα(0, qn;h)
unUα(0, qn;h)
= g(ρn, αqn(1− ρ
2
n)) = g(ρn, γn),
in view of (5.4). That such a γn exists and is unique follows from Lemma 7.1 part i). Now, let ρn → 1 and
note that
pn − pˆ
1− ρ2n
=
g(ρn, γn)− g(1, 0)
1− ρ2n
.
Assume that supn |pn − pˆ|/(1 − ρ2n) < ∞. Then Lemma 7.1 implies γn → 0 and hence by the first order
Taylor approximation (higher orders may be ignored since ρn → 1, γn → 0)
pn − pˆ
1− ρ2n
=
g(ρn, γn)− g(1, 0)
1− ρ2n
≈
−1
1 + ρn
∂ρg(1, 0) +
γn
1− ρ2n
∂γ(1, 0).
The equivalence in (5.10) readily follow. Lastly, assume that pn → p 6= pˆ. Then by continuity γn → γ
where γ satisfies p = g(1, γ). Thus, by Lemma 7.1, γ 6= 0 if and only if p 6= pˆ.

Proof of Proposition 5.7. Here, the monetary error takes the form
MEn := qn
∣∣pnUα(qn;h) − pα∣∣ = γnα(1 − ρ2n)
∣∣∣∣− 1γn log(f(ρn, γn))− pα
∣∣∣∣ .
To estimate the error it is now necessary to go out two terms in the Taylor expansion for log(f(ρn, γn))
around log(f(1, γ)) (higher order terms may be ignored as discussed below). Note that for all γ ≥ 0,
f(1, γ) > 0 and the first and second order partial derivatives of f exist and are finite. Thus, since (1 −
ρn)/(1 − ρ
2
n) ≤ 1, terms in the Taylor expansion which involve partials with respect to ρ, even when
divided by 1 − ρ2n, remain bounded as n ↑ ∞. Hence, the only terms which will affect the finiteness of
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the monetary error involve log(f(1, γ)), ∂γ log(f(1, γ)) and ∂2γγ log(f(1, γ) and it suffices to consider the
approximation
log(f(ρn, γn)) ≈ log(f(1, γ)) + (γn − γ)
∂γf
f
(1, γ) +
1
2
(γn − γ)
2
(
∂2γγf
f
−
(
∂γf
f
)2)
(1, γ).
Note that ∂2γγf/f − (∂γf/f)2 = −∂γg where g is from (5.9). By Lemma 7.1, ∂γg < 0. Case (i) is handled
first : here pα = −∂γ log(f)(1, 0) = E [Zh(YT )]. Using the above expansion, and the fact that f(1, 0) = 1
MEn ≈
γ2n
2α(1 − ρ2n)
∣∣(∂2γγf − (∂γf)2)(1, 0)∣∣ ,
and hence the result follows. Now, consider case (ii) : here pα = −(1/γ) log(f(1, γ)). Using the above
expansion it follows that
MEn ≈
|γn − γ|
α(1− ρ2n)
∣∣∣∣∣∂γff (1, γ) + 12(γn − γ)
(
∂2γγf
f
−
(
∂γf
f
)2)
(1, γ)−
1
γ
log f(1, γ)
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
proving the result for case (ii). Now, let p ∈ I(h) and assume γn is chosen optimally from Proposition
5.5 so that p = g(ρn, γn). If p = pˆ then by (5.10), since pn = pˆ for all n it holds that supn |qn| < ∞
and hence the monetary error is trivially finite. If p 6= pˆ, by Proposition 5.5 again, γn → γ 6= 0 where
p = g(1, γ). Therefore, γn is in regime (ii) of (5.4) and hence the monetary error is finite if and only if
supn |γn − γ|/(1 − ρ
2
n) < ∞. Using the notation in part ii) of Lemma 7.1, γn = γ(ρn) and γ = γ(1).
Since the map ρ 7→ γ(ρ) is C1 on R, for any ε > 0 by taking n large enough
|γn − γ|
1− ρ2n
=
|γ(ρn)− γ(1)|
1− ρ2n
=
1
1 + ρn
1
1− ρn
∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
ρn
γ′(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |γ′(1)|+ ε2 ,
and hence the monetary error is bounded. 
Proof of Proposition 5.8. As shown in [43], the dual optimal element Qn,qn is constructed using the Mar-
tingale Representation Theorem. Specifically, there exists anFW adapted process θn such that (5.12) holds.
For this θn, define Qn,qn by
dQn,qn
dP
:= E
(∫ ·
0
(−ρnλ(Yt) + θ
n
t ) dWt −
∫ ·
0
(√
1− ρ2nλ(YT )−
ρn√
1− ρ2n
θnt
)
dBt
)
T
.
It is easy to check that Qn,qn ∈ Mn and a calculation shows that H (Qn,qn | P) < ∞. Furthermore, Qn,qn
solves the dual problem. This latter fact follows by considering the (potentially non-admissible) trading
strategy pit := (1/ασ(Yt))(λ(Yt) + (ρn)/(1 − ρ2n)θnt ) and showing that the corresponding wealth process
Xpi and dQn,qn/dP satisfy the first order conditions for optimality. Then, from [27, Theorem 2.1] it follows
that
∫
piudSu/Su is a Qn,qn martingale and hence Qn,qn is dual optimal. A straightforward calculation using
(5.2) gives
dQn,qnW
dQˆnW
=
e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ−γnh(YT )
E
[
Z(ρn)e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ−γnh(YT )
] .
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Therefore, using (7.2), (5.9) and that p = g(ρn, γn) for g from (5.9):
H
(
Q
n,qn(p)
W | Qˆ
n
W
)
= γn(p
n
Uα(qn;h)− p)− (1− ρ
2
n)
E
[
ΛZ(ρn)e
−(1−ρ2n)Λ−γnh(YT )
]
E
[
Z(ρn)e−(1−ρ
2
n)Λ−γnh(YT )
]
− log
(
E
[
Z(ρn)e
−(1−ρ2n)Λ
])
,
and so the result follows by Proposition 5.3 since γn → γ 6= 0.

APPENDIX A. SUPPORTING LEMMAS
Remark A.1. Throughout this section, (Ω,F ,P) represents a generic probability space and all expecta-
tions, unless explicitly stated otherwise, are with respect to P. Inequalities regarding random variables are
assumed to hold P almost surely.
Lemma A.2. Let Y ≥ 0. The following three statements are equivalent:
1) E [V (yY )] <∞ for all α > 0, U ∈ Uα and y > 0.
2) E [V (yY )] <∞ for some α > 0, U ∈ Uα and y > 0.
3) E [Y log Y ] <∞.
Furthermore, let p > 1 and set γ = p/(p− 1). Then the following three statements are also equivalent:
A) E [V (yY )] <∞ for all l > 0, U ∈ Up,l and y > 0.
B) E [V (yY )] <∞ for some l > 0, U ∈ Up,l y > 0.
C) E [Y γ ] <∞.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Let α > 0 and U ∈ Uα. In view of (2.9), for any ε > 0 there is some constant
M = M(ε, U) > 0 such that on z ≥M , ((1 − ε)/α)z(log(z) − 1) ≤ V (z) ≤ ((1 + ε)/α)z(log(z)− 1).
Since both |V (z)| and |z log(z) − 1| are bounded on [0,M ], there is some C = C(ε,M) > 0 so that
−C +
1− ε
α
z log(z) ≤ V (z) ≤ C +
1 + ε
α
z log(z).(A.1)
The equivalences 1)⇔ 2)⇔ 3) now readily follow. Similarly, in view of (4.1) for any ε > 0 there is some
constant M = M(ε, U) so that on z ≥ M , (1 − ε)(1/γ)lˆzγ ≤ V (z) ≤ (1 + ε)lˆzγ . Again, since |V (z)|
and zγ are bounded on [0,M ] there is a constant C = C(ε, U) so that
(A.2) − C + (1− ε)lˆzγ ≤ V (z) ≤ C + (1 + ε)lˆzγ .
The equivalences A)⇔ B)⇔ C) readily follow.

Lemma A.3. Let α > 0, p > 1, l > 0. Let U ∈ Uα or U ∈ Up,l. Let Y ≥ 0 be such that E [Y ] = 1 and
such that E [V (Y )] < ∞. Then the map y 7→ E [V (yY )] is differentiable with derivative E [Y V ′(yY )].
Furthermore, for any x ∈ R there exists a unique y such that E [Y V ′(yY )] = x.
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Proof. Consider the function
f(ε, z) :=
V ((y + ε)z) − V (yz)
ε
−
V (yz)
y
; ε > 0, z ≥ 0.
Note that f(ε, 0) = 0 and, as V ′ is strictly increasing, ∂zf(ε, z) ≥ 0. The convexity of V implies f(ε, Y ) ≤
V ((1 + y)Y ) − V (yY ) − V (yY )/y. That ∂yE [V (yY )] = E [Y V ′(yY )] now follows by applying the
dominated convergence theorem to f(ε, Y ), since Lemma A.2 implies E [V (yY )] <∞ for all y > 0.
Now, consider the map g(y) := E [Y V ′(yY )]. The strict convexity of V implies g is strictly increasing.
Since limz↓ zV ′(z) = 0 (because U is bounded from above), there is some constant C > 0 such that
Y V ′(yY ) > −C for y > 1. Thus, since limz↑∞ V ′(z) =∞ (because of the Inada conditions) it follows by
Fatou’s Lemma that limy↑∞ g(y) = ∞. For the limit as y ↓ 0, assume y < 1. Denote by yˆ by the unique
number such that V ′(yˆ) = 0. Clearly
g(y) = E
[
Y V ′(yY )1yY≤yˆ
]
+ E
[
Y V ′(yY )1yY >yˆ
]
.
Fatou’s Lemma and limz↓0 V ′(z) = −∞ imply that limy↓0 E [Y V ′(yY )1yY ≤yˆ] = −∞. As for the second
term, since y < 1, V ′(yY ) ≤ V ′(Y ). Thus, using [40, Corollary 4.2 (ii)] (note : part (ii) therein does not
require U(0) > 0) there is a constant C > 0 so that
E
[
Y V ′(yY )1yY≥yˆ
]
≤ E
[
Y V ′(Y )1yY ≥yˆ
]
≤ CE [V (Y )] <∞.
Thus, limy↓0 g(y) = −∞ and the result holds.

Lemma A.4. Let α > 0, p > 1 and l > 0. Let u > 0 and Y ≥ 0 be such that E [Y ] = 1. Then, for each
0 < ε < u there exists a constant C(ε, U) > 0 independent of Y and u such that
(A.3) inf
y>0
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≤ C(ε, U) +


1+ε
α E [Y log(Y )] + u U ∈ Uα
1
αE [Y log(Y )] + u U ∈ U˜α
(l(u+ ε))1/p ((1 + ε)E [Y γ ])1/γ U ∈ Up,l
.
Proof. Clearly, infy>0(1/y) (E [V (yY )] + u) ≤ E [V (Y )] + u. Let ε > 0. In view of (A.1), there is some
constant C = C(ε, U) so that E [V (Y )] + u ≤ C + ((1 + ε)/α)E [Y log(Y )] + u. This proves (A.3) for
U ∈ Uα. Now, consider U ∈ U˜α and define
(A.4) fU(z) := V (z) − 1
α
z(log(z)− 1).
Using the definition of U˜α, calculation shows that lim supz↑∞ |fU(z)| /z < ∞. Since fU(0) = 0, there is
some M = M(ε, U) so that fU(z) ≤M(1 + z) for z > 0. Therefore, since E [Y ] = 1:
E [V (Y )] + u =
1
α
E [Y log(Y )] + E [fU (Y )] + u ≤
1
α
E [Y log(Y )] + 2M + u.
Thus, (A.3) holds for U ∈ U˜α. Lastly, for U ∈ Up,l since limz↓0 V (z) = 0 and (4.1) holds, for any
0 < ε < u there is some M = M(ε, U) so that V (z) < ε on z < 1/M , V (z) ≤M on 1/M ≤ z ≤M and
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V (z) ≤ (1 + ε)lˆzγ on z > M . Thus, by splitting yY according to whether yY < 1/M , 1/M ≤ yY ≤M
and yY > M one obtains
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≤
u+ ε
y
+ V (M)
1
y
E
[
1yY≥1/M
]
+ (1 + ε)lˆyγ−1E [Y γ ] .
Now, (1/y)E
[
1yY≥1/M
]
≤M since E [Y ] = 1. Additionally, a direct calculation shows that
inf
y>0
(
u+ ε
y
+ (1 + ε)lˆyγ−1E [Y γ ]
)
= γ
(
u+ ε
γ − 1
)1/p (
(1 + ε)lˆE [Y γ ]
)1/γ
,
Since γ(γ − 1)−1/p lˆ1/γ = l1/p, (A.3) holds for U ∈ Up,l. 
Lemma A.5. Let α > 0, p > 1 and l > 0. Let u > 0 and Y ≥ 0 be such that E [Y ] = 1. Then for each
0 < ε < min{u, 1} there exist constants C(ε, U),D(ε, U) > 0 independent of Y and u such that
(A.5) inf
y>0
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≥ −C(ε, U) +


1−ε
α E [Y log(Y )] +D(ε, U) log(u) U ∈ Uα
1
αE [Y log(Y )] +D(ε, U) log(u) U ∈ U˜α(
l(u− ε2)
)1/p
((1− ε)E [Y γ ])1/γ U ∈ Up,l
.
Proof of Lemma A.5. Let 0 < ε < min{u, 1}. In view of V (0) = 0 and (2.9), there is some M = M(ε, U)
large enough so that V (z) ≥ −ε/2 on z < 1/M , V (z) ≥ U(0) on 1/M ≤ z ≤ M and V (z) ≥
(1− ε)(1/α)z(log(z)− 1) on z > M . Since U(0) < 0, by splitting yY according to whether yY < 1/M ,
1/M ≤ yY ≤M or yY > M one obtains
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≥
u− ε/2
y
+ U(0)
1
y
E
[
11/M≤yY
]
+
1− ε
α
E [Y (log(yY )− 1)(1 − 1yY≤M )] .
(A.6)
As before (1/y)E
[
1yY≥1/M
]
≤M . Furthermore, E [Y (log(yY )− 1)1yY ≤M ] ≤ log(M)− 1. Thus
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≥
u− ε/2
y
+ U(0)M +
1− ε
α
log(y) +
1− ε
α
E [Y log(Y )]−
1− ε
α
log(M).
Since u− ε/2 > 0,
(A.7) inf
y>0
(
1− ε
α
log(y) +
u− ε/2
y
)
=
1− ε
α
(
1 + log
(
α(u− ε/2)
1− ε
))
,
By adding and subtracting (1− ε)/α log(u) and using that 1− ε/(2u) ≥ 1/2, (A.5) holds for U ∈ Uα with
C(ε, U) =
(
U(0)M +
1− ε
α
(
1 + log
(
α
2M(1− ε)
)))
; D(ε, U) =
1− ε
α
.
Regarding (A.5) for U ∈ U˜α, let fU be as in (A.4) and recall from the previous lemma that f(0) = 0
and lim supz↑∞ |fU(z)|/z < ∞. Given this, for the given ε there exists constants M = M(ε, U) and
K = K(ε, U) so that fU(z) ≥ −ε/2 for z < 1/M , fU(z) ≥ −K for 1/M ≤ z ≤ M and fU (z) ≥ −Kz
on z > M . Thus
1
y
E [fU(yY )] ≥ −
ε
2y
−K
1
y
E
[
11/M≤yY
]
−KE [Y 1yY >M ] ≥ −
ε
2y
−K(1 +M),(A.8)
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where the last inequality follows because (1/y)E
[
11/M≤yY
]
≤M and E [Y ] = 1. This gives
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) =
1
α
E [Y (log(yY )− 1)] +
1
y
E [fU (yY )] +
u
y
,
≥
u− ε/2
y
+
1
α
log(y) +
1
α
E [Y log(Y )]−
1
α
−K(1 +M).
(A.5) follows by repeating the argument begun in (A.7) above, except that 1/α log(y) replaces ((1 −
ε)/α) log(y). Lastly, (A.5) for U ∈ Up,lis treated. Here, the calculations are the same as above except
that V (z) ≥ (1− ε)lˆzγ on z > M . This gives
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≥
u− ε/2
y
+ U(0)M + (1− ε)lˆyγ−1E [Y γ(1− 1yY≤M )] .
yγ−1E [Y γ1yY≤M ] ≤M
γ−1 since E [Y ] = 1. This gives
1
y
(E [V (yY )] + u) ≥
u− ε/2
y
+ U(0)M − (1− ε)lˆMγ−1 + (1− ε)lˆyγ−1E [Y γ ] .
Calculation shows that
inf
y>0
(
u− ε/2
y
+ (1− ε)lˆyγ−1E [Y γ ]
)
= γ
(
u− ε/2
γ − 1
)1/p (
(1− ε)lˆE [Y γ ]
)1/γ
.
Since as shown in the previous lemma, γ(γ − 1)−1/p lˆ1/γ = l1/p, (A.5) holds with C(ε, U) = −U(0)M +
(1− ε)lˆMγ−1. 
REFERENCES
[1] M. ANTHROPELOS AND G. ŽITKOVI ´C, On agent’s agreement and partial-equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets, Math.
Finance, 20 (2010), pp. 411–446.
[2] P. BANK AND D. KRAMKOV, A model for a large investor trading at market indifference prices i : Single period case.
Preprint. Electronic version available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.3224, 2011.
[3] D. BECHERER, Rational hedging and valuation of integrated risks under constant absolute risk aversion, Insurance Math.
Econom., 33 (2003), pp. 1–28.
[4] S. BIAGINI, M. FRITTELLI, AND M. GRASSELLI, Indifference price with general semimartingales, Math. Finance, 21
(2011), pp. 423–446.
[5] BIS, Amounts outstanding of over-the-counter derivatives by risk category and instrument, Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), (2012). http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm.
[6] B. BOUCHARD, R. ELIE, AND L. MOREAU, A note on utility based pricing and asymptotic risk diversification, Mathematics
and Financial Economics, 6 (2012), pp. 59–74.
[7] L. CARASSUS AND M. RÁSONYI, Convergence of utility indifference prices to the superreplication price: the whole real
line case, Acta Appl. Math., 96 (2007), pp. 119–135.
[8] , Risk-averse asymptotics for reservation prices, Annals of Finance, 7 (2011), pp. 375–387.
[9] R. CARMONA, Indifference pricing, Princeton Series in Financial Engineering, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
2009. Theory and applications.
[10] R. CONT AND T. KOKHOLM, A consistent pricing model for index options and volatility derivatives, Math. Finance, 23
(2013), pp. 248–274.
[11] R.-A. DANA AND M. JEANBLANC, Financial markets in continuous time, Springer Finance, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003.
Translated from the 1998 French original by Anna Kennedy.
LARGE POSITION PRICING 29
[12] M. H. A. DAVIS, Option pricing in incomplete markets, in Mathematics of derivative securities (Cambridge, 1995), vol. 15
of Publ. Newton Inst., Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 216–226.
[13] , Optimal hedging with basis risk, in From stochastic calculus to mathematical finance, Springer, Berlin, 2006, pp. 169–
187.
[14] M. DE DONNO, P. GUASONI, AND M. PRATELLI, Super-replication and utility maximization in large financial markets,
Stochastic Process. Appl., 115 (2005), pp. 2006–2022.
[15] F. DELBAEN, P. GRANDITS, T. RHEINLÄNDER, D. SAMPERI, M. SCHWEIZER, AND C. STRICKER, Exponential hedging
and entropic penalties, Math. Finance, 12 (2002), pp. 99–123.
[16] A. DEMBO AND O. ZEITOUNI, Large deviations techniques and applications, vol. 38 of Applications of Mathematics (New
York), Springer-Verlag, New York, second ed., 1998.
[17] D. DUFFIE, Dynamic asset pricing theory, Princeton University Press, 2010.
[18] D. DUFFIE, N. GaˆRLEANU, AND L. H. PEDERSEN, Over-the-counter markets, Econometrica, 73 (2005), pp. pp. 1815–1847.
[19] , Valuation in over-the-counter markets, The Review of Financial Studies, 20 (2007), pp. pp. 1865–1900.
[20] H. FÖLLMER AND W. SCHACHERMAYER, Asymptotic arbitrage and large deviations, Math. Financ. Econ., 1 (2007),
pp. 213–249.
[21] C. FREI AND M. SCHWEIZER, Exponential utility indifference valuation in two Brownian settings with stochastic correlation,
Adv. in Appl. Probab., 40 (2008), pp. 401–423.
[22] , Exponential utility indifference valuation in a general semimartingale model, in Optimality and risk—modern trends
in mathematical finance, Springer, Berlin, 2009, pp. 49–86.
[23] V. HENDERSON, Valuation of claims on nontraded assets using utility maximization, Math. Finance, 12 (2002), pp. 351–373.
[24] S. D. HODGES AND A. NEUBERGER, Optimal replication of contingent claims under transactions costs, Review of Futures
Markets, 8 (1989), pp. 222–239.
[25] A. ˙ILHAN, M. JONSSON, AND R. SIRCAR, Optimal investment with derivative securities, Finance Stoch., 9 (2005), pp. 585–
595.
[26] , Portfolio optimization with derivatives and indifference pricing, in Indifference Pricing, R. Carmona, ed., Princeton
Series in Financial Engineering, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009. Theory and applications.
[27] Y. M. KABANOV AND C. STRICKER, On the optimal portfolio for the exponential utility maximization: remarks to the
six-author paper “Exponential hedging and entropic penalties” [Math. Finance 12 (2002), no. 2, 99–123; MR1891730
(2003b:91046)] by F. Delbaen, P. Grandits, T. Rheinländer, D. Samperi, M. Schweizer and C. Stricker, Math. Finance, 12
(2002), pp. 125–134.
[28] J. KALLSEN AND T. RHEINLÄNDER, Asymptotic utility-based pricing and hedging for exponential utility, Statist. Decisions,
28 (2011), pp. 17–36.
[29] I. KARATZAS AND S. G. KOU, On the pricing of contingent claims under constraints, Ann. Appl. Probab., 6 (1996), pp. 321–
369.
[30] I. KARATZAS AND S. E. SHREVE, Methods of mathematical finance, vol. 39 of Applications of Mathematics (New York),
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
[31] D. KRAMKOV AND M. SÎRBU, Sensitivity analysis of utility-based prices and risk-tolerance wealth processes, Ann. Appl.
Probab., 16 (2006), pp. 2140–2194.
[32] M. MANIA AND M. SCHWEIZER, Dynamic exponential utility indifference valuation, Ann. Appl. Probab., 15 (2005),
pp. 2113–2143.
[33] M. A. MILEVSKY, S. D. PROMISLOW, AND V. R. YOUNG, Killing the law of large numbers: Mortality risk premiums and
the sharpe ratio, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73 (2006), pp. pp. 673–686.
[34] M. MONOYIOS, The minimal entropy measure and an Esscher transform in an incomplete market model, Statist. Probab.
Lett., 77 (2007), pp. 1070–1076.
30 LARGE POSITION PRICING
[35] M. MUSIELA AND T. ZARIPHOPOULOU, An example of indifference prices under exponential preferences, Finance Stoch.,
8 (2004), pp. 229–239.
[36] T. NEGISHI, Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy, Metroeconomica, 12 (1960),
pp. 92–97.
[37] M. P. OWEN AND G. ŽITKOVI ´C, Optimal investment with an unbounded random endowment and utility-based pricing, Math.
Finance, 19 (2009), pp. 129–159.
[38] R. ROUGE AND N. EL KAROUI, Pricing via utility maximization and entropy, Math. Finance, 10 (2000), pp. 259–276.
INFORMS Applied Probability Conference (Ulm, 1999).
[39] W. RUDIN, Principles of mathematical analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, third ed., 1976. International Series in
Pure and Applied Mathematics.
[40] W. SCHACHERMAYER, Optimal investment in incomplete markets when wealth may become negative, Ann. Appl. Probab.,
11 (2001), pp. 694–734.
[41] SIFMA, U.s. mortgage related securities issuance, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), (2012).
http://sifma.org/research.
[42] P. SIORPAES, Optimal investment with stocks and derivatives. 2013.
[43] M. TEHRANCHI, Explicit solutions of some utility maximization problems in incomplete markets, Stochastic Process. Appl.,
114 (2004), pp. 109–125.
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, WEAN HALL 6113, PITTSBURGH, PA
15213, USA
E-mail address: scottrob@andrew.cmu.edu
